Record revealed
Report on the British Indian Army, 1943
Over two million British Indian Army troops fought in the Second World War. This 1943 War Office document reported on the army's battle readiness and made recommendations for its development.
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Partial transcript
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Improvement of Status of Infantry.
(a) To make the Infantry a more attractive proposition, emoluments should be increased for both British and Indian infantry.
(b) The Infantry should have prior claim in the selection of Officer Cadets and educated recruits.
(c) Posting from Infantry bns [battalions]. to extra regimental employment should cease.
2. Improvement of Basic Training.
British Infantry.
Drafts arriving in India must undergo:–
(a) Acclimatisation and discipline.
(b) Toughening and weapon training.
(c) Elementary jungle training.
Indian Infantry.
The period of basic training for the recruit should be increased to 11 months, training to be progressive, and to include two months at a training division, where jungle warfare will be taught.
3. Improvement of Collective Training.
(a) Esprit de corps, liaison between arms, etc. must be inculcated into active formations, and this can only be done by collective training.
(b) Co-operation with other arms and with the R.A.F. before undertaking active operations.
4. Officers.
(a) Commanding officers should hold command for at least a year, and normally not for more than two years.
(b) “Middle Piece” Regular officers should be returned to active bns. Each bn. Should have at least three such officers.
(c) The most promising young officers should go in to the Infantry and not the other arms
(d) A simple basic Urdu, simplifying the language question should be introduced.
(e) Unsuitable officers should be eliminated.
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Transcript
6. Improvements of Organisation.
The creation of experimental formations should cease, and a basic standard division containing a minimum of specialised infantry bns. should be evolved.
7. Improvement of the Reinforcement system.
Recommendations in this connection have not been summarised, as they deal with the formation of training divisions, now a ‘fait accompli’.
8. Morale.
(a) Regimental esprit de corps, founded on regimental history, traditions and customs should be fostered in all ranks during their training before going to their active bns.
(b) The “Spit and Polish” discipline should be reintroduced.
(c) The Military Leave Train System should be extended to safeguard Indian trips against subversive propaganda.
(d) The welfare of the troops requires improvement. The various agencies at present working independently for the troops should be co-ordinated.
(e) A clear-cut guarantee by the British Government that there will be no discrimination with regard to general demobilisation between troops in Europe and those in the Far East, will do much to improve morale in India.
(f) The condition of British bns. on internal security should be examined with a view to supporting their efficiency and consequently their morale.
(G) Certain financial factors, e.g. disability pensions and widows allowances should be investigated.
M.O.12.
11 Oct 43.
Why this record matters
Date: 11 October 1943
Catalogue reference: WO 106/3782
As India was part of the British Empire when the Second World War broke out, the British Indian Army was called upon to serve in the Allied effort. A volunteer army, rather than a conscripted one, it entered the war as a force of around 240,000.
It had been advised by the British government that it was unlikely to fight on the frontline. However, by 1940, Indian forces were serving in the North and East African campaigns.
Later that year, in order to support the British Empire's defence of Malaya and Iraq, the Indian Army was rapidly expanded by six divisions. In 1941, as the Japanese threat grew in Southeast Asia, it grew further.
In the Spring of 1943, the Eastern Army (composed of both British and Indian troops) were defeated by Japanese forces at the first battle of Arakan, Burma. After the loss, a British Infantry Committee was established to assess what went wrong, the army's readiness and suggest improvements. Following a number of defeats during the early years of the war – including the retreat of France, and loss of Malaya and Singapore – these assessments were taking place across the British army.
As shown in this record, its main recommendations were:
- The army should have first claims on new officers and educated recruits as well as improved pay.
- Basic training should be increased to nine months followed by two months' specialised jungle training, 11 in total.
- The reinforcement system should be improved, and drafts should include experienced officers.
- Army brigades should include a British, an Indian and a Gurkha battalion.
Another key recommendation, as the record outlines, was jungle warfare training. Most Indian Army officers had experience of the North-West Frontier, but few had knowledge of jungle terrain where much of their deployment would take place. This had cost them in Arakan.
In response, the 14th and 39th Divisions were converted into jungle training units. The 14th had served at Arakan, so had some knowledge, and was now based at Chhindwara, surrounded by jungle.
A training manual, titled 'The Jungle Book', was published in September 1943. It instructed commanding officers on how to train their units in the specialised fighting methods required to win in this challenging climate. Examples included jungle craft, physical fitness, marksmanship and decentralised control. The publication also stressed the importance of taking anti-malaria medication, which was rigorously enforced by senior commanders from late 1943. The training manual was used for the remainder of the war.
These changes to the organisation, equipment, and training of British Indian units in 1943 were significant. They rebuilt the overall combat effectiveness of troops, building confidence and morale. In September, Auchinleck, head of India Command, informed his chiefs that the training division would ‘go far to improve the individual efficiency of reinforcements, particularly in jungle warfare, both of junior officers and other ranks’.
Following these changes came key victories, including at the second battle of Arakan in February 1944, and then at the Battles of Kohima and Imphal, fought between March and July 1944. By 1945, more than two million Indians had served in the Indian Army fighting in campaigns across Europe, Africa, and Asia.