Folios 89-106. Details of arrangements to be made for besieging D [Dunkirk]; it should...

Folios 89-106. Details of arrangements to be made for besieging D [Dunkirk]; it should be attacked by both a land and sea force. The sea force will need inter alia clean galleys for mortars and light frigates that can approach Le Havre. The land force should comprise 60 to 70 infantry battalions and 80 to 100 cavalry and dragoon squadrons. The circumvallation will be lengthy and will require five separate quarters (Graveline, between Bourborg and Bergue, and Mourre [Les Moeres?] canals, Mourre and Veurne, and the sea). They would not be able to follow the ordinary rules of war to invest the place because of the canals and ditches etc. instead assembling a large army at Genappe or Louvain as soon as the season permits and approaching the Sambre from there to draw the jealousy of the enemy in that direction; at the same time the allied army will approach the Rhine, the Moselle and the Meuse to draw all the enemy forces from Flanders; at the same time the fleet will set sail with all they need for an attack and appear to leave the canal at which time the troops of the Flemish garrisons will be assembled to approach Ostend and Nieuwpoort on the pretext of wishing to fortify the latter, and the corps being assembled around Brussels will slip into Flanders. Once all this is in place, and the fleet at sea with troops and artillery necessary for a large scale attack, they will fix a date to launch the attack. The plan of attack is set out, launched by the sea fleet and joined by the troops marching from Nieuwpoort and Sambre, investing the town and establishing the five quarters for circumvallation before undertaking two good and one false attack. Since the siege of this place will be of great consequence and difficulty, it is worth reflection on the following points: potential for winds to disrupt measures by sea; implications of the flooding of the land between the canal de la Mourre and Veurne; depriving the besieged of fresh water by flooding the canals and ditches with seawater; provisions for the troops; the need for 16 to 20,000 peasants to work at the lines; preparations for the sick or wounded; how to distribute the troops across the quarters; the enemy's likely efforts to rescue the town either on the side of Gravelines or on the side of Veurn. Advises for these reasons, prior to undertaking such an enterprise, there must be close examination of the conditions necessary and of all that could go well or badly.