Folios 367-382: Home Riggs Popham, HMS Stirling Castle, Spithead. Popham refers to...

Folios 367-382: Home Riggs Popham, HMS Stirling Castle, Spithead.

Popham refers to their Lordships' letter of the 30 May, and the explanation they require re his handling of the convoy. His orders of 5 April 1813 directed him to take under his command HMS Indefatigable, and having received on board the Earl of Moira KG, appointed Governor of Bengal, plus his family, servants etc, and taking under his protection the storeship Cormorant, and a list of East India ships, to sail immediately for Madeira. There to take on wine and necessaries they and to sail again as soon as possible, and when the right latitudes were reached Popham should signal for the Indefatigable to part company for the Brazils, the Batavia East India ship to St Helena, and the Cormorant to make her own way to the Cape of Good Hope. He would take the rest on to the Cape, then allow them to pursue their respective voyages. Should he need to put into any Brazil port for water he was to take all the ships with him, lose no time, and tell the Indefatigable's captain to put himself under the command of Rear Admiral Dixon. Once parted with the other ships he was to go to Madras, to land Earl Moria, then report to Vice Admiral Hood for further orders. He recounts the actual events: sailed from St Helens 20 April 1813 with convoy, letter of confirmation to Admiral Sir Richard Bickerton; letter to the Admiralty same day noted defective rudder; 25 April report of progress noted that Portuguese ship did not continue with convoy due to adverse wind; 13 May arrived Madeira, but the Ceres, Urbano, and Eliza, two of them whalers, parted company, passing the island without any communication; wishing to hurry the process of provisioning the ships he knows the wine and beef are much better at Teneriffe than Madeira so despatches the Indefatigable on to get supplies there (leaves 16 May), thinking there can be no objection; 14 May, masters Robert Hayley of the Somersetshire, Thomas Taylor of the Rose, William Cox of the Rachael & Ann, and William Trip of the George, wish to continue on to the Brazils, needing nothing at Madeira and saying delay may be very prejudicial - they agree to keep company and are well armed. Popham refuses but all except the Rachael & Ann leave secretly in the night, without his authority. Wrote to Admiralty on the 15th to report all this in abstract. 23 May he and convoy leave for Teneriffe to join Indefatigable, arriving the second day, and proceed that same day after completing wine and provisions.

In Funchal Roads on 18 May he received a letter from several English merchants at Madeira, asking for a convoy to the West Indies - he refused as it had not come through the consulate. The Consul, Mr Veitch, sent a formal application, he and Popham agreed that 'Commerce' would best be served by the Prometheus continuing to England with the mails, as per original orders, than taking a convoy to the West Indies. Popham wrote to inform the Admiralty of this on 20 May. Popham then refutes a letter from John Bennett Junior, from Lloyds, 16 June 1813, which claimed that Popham sent the Indefatigable off to sail in convoy with the Brazil ships on 16 May - Popham calls it 'mere hearsay based on misinformation', and says the ship was only sent forward to Teneriffe prepare wine for the company, so that 'not an hour would be lost'. In fact the Indefatigable did not part company with him for the Brazils until 23 June, in the 'proper latitude' and according to Orders. Then discusses a letter from Mr Veitch, the Consul at Madeira, to William Hamilton on 26 June, which gives the impression that Popham had given the Brazil-bound East India ships permission to sail, believing theyweren't able to complete their provisioning in time - three had sailed immediately and two others applied to Veitch for permission, which he says he refused absolutely, so that they remained with the convoy. Popham says not only is this not the case, but there was no possible way of knowing that they would not complete their provisioning in time and Mr Veitch was entirely mistaken that he had given the masters permission to leave. He cannot imagine why Mr Veitch should say so, but 'cannot help thinking' that Veitch himself gave them leave to depart, thinking it was correct to do so. Much more follows about his longterm good relations with the Consul and what might have occurred to cause a misunderstanding. Next he refers to his letter of 23 May 1813 to their Lordships, from Santa Cruz, informing them of his arrival there and saying the Stirling Castle and the Indefatigable had completed their wines, the convoy did not anchor there, and four other ships there, the HMSS Phoebe, Doris, Salsette, and Porcupine, had also anchored to complete their wine. On 30 May he gave Captain John Fyffe sealed orders, not to be opened until signalled to do so or 24 hours after parting by chance, and they proceeded together until 23 June, when having crossed the Line, Popham decided to continue without touching at the Brazils. He stuck to this decision, in order to expedite the voyage and adhere strictly to his Orders, despite being told that Earl Moira did 'have an inclination' to stop at the Brazils and that the Prince there would give Popham 'marks of distinction'. He therefore made dispositions for separating, and gave Fyffe orders on 23 June to take the Brazil ships in convoy and proceed to Rio de Janeiro. That same day Popham wrote to the Admiralty, reporting his position, and the circumstances of his decision not to go to Brazil but to continue to the Cape with the five East India ships and the Cormorant. Details his 14 enclosures, copies of all mentioned correspondence, and says his officers will also confirm his account on oath if required. Reiterates that the main points are that he did not separate from the Brazil convoy at Madeira, did not permit the Brazil Trade ships to sail from there without him, and that in sending the Indefatigable to Tenerife ahead, he was merely ensuring the best provisions and a much faster turnaround than other convoys, as he had done so successfully on a previous voyage, when in charge of a squadron to the Cape of Good Hope. Further, the sailing to Teneriffe was not out of their way, but in their direct course, and on it they had taken into safe convoy another vessel, the Cambridge East Indiaman, met at sea. Popham then turns to his service record, the 'many important stations and duties' with which he has been entrusted, his period as Captain of the Fleet at Copenhagen, for which he received their Lordships' 'particular approbation and the thanks of both Houses of Parliament', not to mention his stint with Lord Wellington on the coast of Spain, whose 'flattering appreciation of my zeal and exertions' had been publicly recorded. He refers to his 'advancing and improving' the signal system for the Navy, at his own expense, so that it was now the best in Europe, if not the world. The completion of this signal system was in his hands, but he had refrained from communication it to their Lordships, though they had asked for it, because of the situation existing with the assertions of Messrs Bennett and Veitch. A further letter is enclosed, from Sir Samuel Hood, which expresses his conviction that the public service will be highly benefited by Popham's signals method. Ends by saying that so many practical demonstrations of his 'zeal and unwearied attentions to the public service', he had hoped, would have had their effect and their Lordships would have given him full credit for accelerating the voyage, a service 'of most inferior nature' to many just alluded to.