Page 64g: letter from Sir Edmund Slade 19th September 1914 - naval force will be...

Page 64g: letter from Sir Edmund Slade 19th September 1914 - naval force will be maintained in the Shatt-al-Arab as long as Goeben and Breslau are not interned by Turkish Government.

Page 65: telegram from Commander in Chief East Indies, [HMS] Swiftsure to Admiralty 21 September 1914 - requiring instructions on how to act.

Page 66: telegram from Viceroy to India Office (repeated to Constantinople, Resident at Bushire and Admiral) 21st September 1914 - Resident to warn Commander [of Odin] not to give Turkish authorities any provocation. Suggests in reply to Turkish protests HM Ambassador should use argument of Treaty of Erzeroum [1847].

Page 67a: History Section Precis. M no number 24th September 1914.

Pages 67c and 67d: Letter from Foreign Office to F C Strick 21st September 1914 - Government Insurance scheme covers the small risk to Mohammerah and the Shatt-el-Arab but responsibility for the SS Seistan proceeding beyond Mohammerah cannot be accepted. If Admiralty concur coal may be conveyed in lighters to Basra.

Page 67e: minute from D.T.D. 26th September 1914 - Strick & Co, Ellerman Bucknall & Co were informed that steamers may proceed to and from Basra if local British authority gives permission. Handwritten amendment from Sir Edmund Slade - There is no objection to coal being taken in lighters but the ship will not get her freight.

Page 68: telegram from Sir Louis Mallet, Constantinople 22nd September 1914 - Foreign Office instructions that British vessels should avoid Turkish ports have not been cancelled. Therefore ships come at their own risk. Agents nervous as capitulations are threatened.

Page 70: telegram from Admiralty to C-in-C East Indies 25th September 1914 - Complaints of Turkish authorities over presence of Odin in the Shatt-al-Arab to be ignored as long as Turkey ignores her obligations of neutrality in Europe.

Page 73: telegram from Sir Edward Grey to Sir Louis Mallet (Constantinople) 29th September 1914 - Turkish Ambassador has again protested to continued presence of HMS Odin in Shatt-el-Arab and that Great Britain should observe the rules of neutrality in other countries. If Grand Vizier makes similar communication Sir Louis Mallet is assure him that if Turkey observes neutrality so will British Government.

Page 78: letter to Winston [Churchill] from India Office 1st October 1914 - it may become imperative to send force to Persian Gulf to impress Arabia. Admiralty reluctant to send force from Bombay unescorted. Writer suggests sending [HMS] Weymouth Bombay as escort.

Page 78a: handwritten note from the Admiralty 1st October 1914 stating that [HMS] Weymouth cannot be diverted from Konigsberg hunt but that HMS] Minerva could be spared for Persian Gulf.

Page 79: telegram from Sir Louis Mallet (Constantinople) 1st October 1914: HM Consul had been informed confidentially of deliberate intention to block Shatt-al-Arab to prevent British man-of-war leaving. British ship has now left Turkish waters.

Page 80: private typescript No 1134 reference my telegrams 1062 and 1065 2nd October 1914: Government has decided to take action and fleet to sail on [October] 10th with expedition A. Admiralty considers no escort necessary from Karachi or Bombay but final decision should rest with Naval Coammnder in Chief. After Force has sailed remainder of sixth division to get ready for despatch but with idea they are destined for Europe or Egypt. Secrecy can be dropped when leading brigade reaches Shatt-al-Arab.

Page 81: telegram to Sir Louis Mallet (Constantinople) From Foreign Office 2nd October 1914: discussion with Turkish Ambassador regarding presence of HMS Odin in the Shatt-al-Arab and the intention of Turkey to remain neutral.

Page 82: History Section Precis M 02349/14 2nd October 1914: (c): telegram from Viceroy 30th September 1914 - owing to presence of Emden impossible to bring fitted transports from Calcutta to Bombay. Departure of convoy postponed. Force B cannot start until arrival of [HMS] Ocean and [HMS] Goliath at Bombay October 18th. (paper M 02349/14). (d): Sir H.B.J. 2nd October 1914: [HMS] Ocean and Goliath should leave Suez October 3rd and reach Bombay October 13th. Convoy probably delayed until October 12th so Goliath and Ocean can join soon after it starts. (paper M 02349/14). (e): letter to India Office 2nd October 1914: anticipated escort ready at Bombay October 12th for transports for Egypt, Mauritius, Mombasa and Persian Gulf. Hopes this will give time for transports from Calcutta to reach Bombay and for Force B to embark and accompany main convoy. (paper M 02349/14).

Page 85: telegram from Sir Louis Mallet [Constantinople] to Sir Edward Grey 4th October 1914: acting consul at Basra has been asked to inform Vali[district governor] that [HMS] Odin has left and that Mallet is communicating with Porte and to warn him [Vali] of the consequences of any rash action against British ship. Great Britain has no intention of attacking Turkey unless first provoked by her.

Page 86: telegram from Sir Louis Mallet [Constantinople] to Sir Edward Grey 4th October 1914: apparently [HMS] Espiegle is at Mohammerah and [RIM] Laurence in Shatt-al-Arab. Mallet has asked Grand Vizier for grounds of Turkish objections to presence of Espiegle in Persian waters and warned of consequences of taking measures against HM ships. Mallet does not think British position very defensible and fears Turks might block the Shatt-al-Arab to prevent British ships from leaving.

Page 88: draft telegram Expedition D signed E.G.B [General Sir Edward Barrow] 4th October 1914 to [?]: force under orders is only intended to occupy Abadan, protect oil tanks and pipe line, cover landing of reinforcements and show Arabs that we intend to support them against Turks. Should Turks become belligerent management of expedition will devolve on you but instructions will come from me. Do not propose to send more troops to Abadan until Turkey shows her hand. In the event of war, the whole Division would be wanted as well as land transport. May be convenient to move Division to Karachi. Shakespeare [Major W.H.I. Shakespear] will leave for Bombay to communicate with Bin Saood. Admiralty requested to make arrangements for disembarkation with Naval Coammnder in Chief. Shall be glad to have full expression of your views.

Page 91: telegram to Commander in Chief, East Indies, Bombay from Admiralty 6th October 1914: Very secret. Indian Government sending small force to Abadan leaving about 13th October. To be called Expedition D. Direct S.N.O. Persian Gulf to co-operate.

Page 94a: History Section Precis. M No Number and 17251/14 6th October 1914.

Page 94c: telegram from Viceroy to India Office 1st October 1914: asking if it is safe for British India mail steamer to call regularly at Mohammerah and Basra. M 17251/14.

Page 94d: memo from D.T.B. 3rd October 1914 - course proposed can be undertaken without undue risk, (paper M 17251/14).

Page 95a: History Section Precis. M 02475/14 6th October 1914.

Page 95c: telegram from H.M.A.C. [Sir Louis Mallet] to Foreign Office 4th October 1914 ?Vali [district governor] writes that Porte has informed you that British warships were to leave Shatt-al-Arab which is inland waters from Fao to Karna and closed to foreign warships. He asks me to advise Captains to go outside Fao, (paper M 02475/14).