CR2-09-11-19-Judgements_IMX30_1.mxf

Session: judgment
Session date: 2009 Nov 19

CASE ID: UKSC 2009/0047
Case name: Louca (Appellant) v A German Judicial Authority (Respondents) (Criminal Appeal from Her Majesty's High Court of Justice)
Case summary:
Judgment: The Supreme Court holds that, when a European Arrest Warrant is issued by the authorities of one Member State for execution in another, it must include a reference to the domestic warrant upon which the European Arrest Warrant is based, but need not include references to any other European Arrest Warrant which may have been issued on the basis of the domestic warrant. The appeal is therefore dismissed. (Paragraph [15])
Reasons for the judgment: Lord Mance gave the judgment of the Court, upholding the reasoning of the Divisional Court. The words “any other warrant” in section 2(4)(c) of the Extradition Act 2003 must be construed in the light of the European Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European Arrest Warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States of the European Union. (Paragraph [3]). The Framework Decision does not require “any other warrant” to include previous EAWs. The relevant part of the Decision – article 8(1)(c) – does not use the phrase “European arrest warrant” as it does elsewhere. The reference to “an enforceable judgment, an arrest warrant or any other enforceable judicial decision” (article 8(1)(c)) cannot sensibly be limited to an EAW. One EAW is most unlikely to be based upon another. (Paragraphs [9]-[10]) There was no other reason to require the EAW to include information about prior EAWs upon which no reliance was being placed. Not doing so would not prevent Mr Louca arguing that extradition was an abuse of process, and other due process factors were comprehensively covered by the Extradition Act. (Paragraphs [13]-[15]).

CASE ID: UKSC 2009/0019
Case name: In re B (a child) (2009) (FC)
Case summary:
Judgment: The Supreme Court unanimously allowed the appeal by GB. In doing so, it reaffirmed the central message in Re G that, where in a case between private individuals a child’s custody or upbringing is in question, the welfare of the child is the paramount consideration. The judgment delivered by Lord Kerr was the judgment of the court to which all of its members contributed.
Reasons for the judgment: A child’s welfare is the paramount consideration in the determination of the question of his or her residence. (Paragraphs [18]-[19], [32]-[37]) The justices’ decision was not “plainly wrong”. They had recognised that H’s welfare was the paramount consideration and had carefully evaluated the evidence before them, correctly weighing up the various competing factors. For this reason, both the judge and the Court of Appeal had erred in overturning the justices’ decision. (Paragraphs [9]-[15], [37]-[39]) Both the judge and the Court of Appeal misinterpreted Re G. When, in that case, Lord Nicholls said that courts should keep in mind that the interests of a child will normally be best served by being reared by his or her biological parent, he was doing no more than reflecting common experience that, in general, children tend to thrive when brought up by parents to whom they have been born. All consideration of the importance of parenthood in private law disputes about residence must be firmly rooted in an examination of what is in the child’s best interests. This is the paramount consideration. It is only as a contributor to the child’s welfare that parenthood assumes any significance. In common with all other factors bearing on what is in the best interests of the child, it must be examined for its potential to fulfil that aim. (Paragraphs [1], [17], [23]-[25], [32]-[37]) Any discussion of a child’s right to be brought up by its natural parents is misplaced. The only consideration for the court is the child’s welfare; to talk of a child’s rights detracts from that consideration. (Paragraphs [18]-[19]) In this case, there was reason to believe that if H’s bond with GB were broken his current stability would be threatened. Whilst RJB was assessed as capable of meeting H’s needs, he had recently undergone significant changes in his own domestic position and his arrangements were untested at the time the justices made their decision. In deciding where H’s best interests lay the justices were therefore right to give significant weight to maintaining the status quo in H’s living arrangements. (Paragraphs [40]-[41]).