Page 115a: History Section Precis. M 02571/14 9 October 1914. Page 115c: letter from...

Page 115a: History Section Precis. M 02571/14 9 October 1914.

Page 115c: letter from the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company to Foreign Office 6 October 1914 - Our Baghdad agents wire that Meissner Pasha, Baghdad Railway Engineer intended to detain barges and tugs belonging to the Societe de Transports Fluviaux en Orient as property of Railway Company with support of Vali of Baghdad. We have therefore decided to retain them at Mohammerah, (paper M 02571/14).

Page 117: telegram from S of S to Viceroy Army Department 10 October 1914 - Private 1207. Your H 1381 Expedition D. - Shakespeare [Major W.H.I. Shakespear] says water difficulty is as great at Bahrein as Basidu but real objection to former is difficulty of getting away if wind is unfavourable. If you decide on Bahrein please wire date on which expedition should arrive there. Important to keep destination secret. [Pencilled note] [HMS] Duke of Edinburgh arrived at Muscat 11 October 1914.

Pages 121-122: telegram from Sir Louis Mallet (Constantinople) to Foreign Office 10 October 1914 - asks on what grounds we can justify claim that British ships can pass through Shatt-al-Arab when we are at war. Question has been referred to legal advisers in Constantinople who are likely to make out case in favour of Turkish contention.

Page 123a: History Section Precis. M 02579/14 10 October 1914.

Page 123c: telegram from British Resident, Bushire to Viceroy and India Office 9 October 1914 - has warned shipping agents at Bushire not to let vessels proceed up river. Arabistan only ship allowed to proceed to Abadan. (paper M 02579/14).

Page 125: telegram to Sir Louis Mallet (Constantinople) from Foreign Office 11 October 1914 - does not believe Vali of Basra will carry out threats unless and until Turkey decides to join Germany and uses situation in Persian Gulf as most plausible pretext. Considers position as set forth in telegram of October 7th meets all Turkish Governments protests so far. The Ambassador may wish to point out to Turkish Government that, last year, in abandoning to Turkey the Persian claim to mid-channel of the Shatt-al-Arab, it was understodd that the right of access to Mohammerah remained unimpaired. Lastly to yield to Turkish threats would destroy our prestige with Arabs, put them on Turkey's side and perhaps encourage her to engage in war we wish to avoid.

Page 126: telegram to Sir Louis Mallet (Constantinople) from Foreign Office 11 October 1914 - key to the situation is in Constantinople and that attitude of Bulgaria and the death of the King of Roumania are factors in keeping Turkey quiet. Would be fatal to give in to Turkish demands especially in the Persian Gulf.

Page 128: telegram from Sir Louis Mallet to Sir Edward Grey 12 October 1914 - the Porte have asked Ambassador to instruct British ships to leave Mohammerah within eight days and return to sea as these ships have disregarded Turkish neutrality.

Page 129: telegram to Sir Louis Mallet (Constantinople) from Foreign Office 12 October 1914 - Porte should be formally notified that HM Government declines to recognise their claim to six mile limit of territorial waters.

Page 130: telegram from Sir Louis Mallet to Foreign Office 12 October 1914 - he does not think it altogether unlikely that Turks might close channel but he does not regard their Note as an ultimatum. General consensus is that Turks are resisting German pressure to enter war. He is anxious that any action on part of British might be interpreted by Turks as aggressive. The closing of the Shatt-al-Arab, which is supposed to be a German objective might be regarded as a precautionary measure like the closing of the Dardanelles. He suggests British reply to Turkish note should be conciliatory.

Page 131: telegram from [HMS] Duke of Edinburgh, Bombay to Admiralty 12 October 1914 - has left for Karachi.

Page 132: telegram from Sir Louis Mallet (Constantinople) to Foreign Office 12 October 1914 - reporting that he has met with the Grand Vizier who assured him there was no ultimatum intended in asking British ships to leave Mohammerah within eight days. Repeated his determination to avoid war. Mallet referred to reports of Turkish fighting in Persia - Grand Vizier said he had sent strict orders that no Turkish troops should force the frontier.

Page 134: telegram from Sir Edward Grey to Sir Louis Mallet 13 October 1914 instructing him how to respond to Turkish note re British warships in the Shatt-al-Arab.

Page 135: telegram from Viceroy 13 October 1914 - advanced force will leave Bombay and Karachi on 16th and 17th October for Bahrain.

Page 136: telegram from Sir Louis Mallet (Constantinople) 13 October 1914 - Vali has notified Consular officer at Basra that [HMS] Espiegle must leave Mohmammerah and Shatt-al-Arab within eight days or be interned until end of war. [RIM] Dalhousie left several days ago.

Page 137a: History Section Precis. M 02646/14 13 October 1914.

Page 137c: telegram from H.M.A.C. to Foreign Office - On 1 October 1914 Porte announced that Turkish Territorial Waters extend to six miles from coast, claiming whole of Sea of Marmora. This includes outer entrance to Dardanelles and whole of Shatt-al-Arab. I have urged Porte to avoid action outside three mile limit which might lead to incident. (paper M 02646/14).

Page 144: telegram from Commander in Chief, East Indies, Bombay to Admiralty 15 October 1914 re situation in Persian Gulf - [RIM] Dalhousie has been sent to entrance of Persian Gulf instead of Mashona. System of intelligence being established at principal places in Persian Gulf.

Page 145: telegram from Sir Louis Mallet to Sir Edward Grey 15 October 1914 - Mr Scott of Baghdad has been authorised to charter a boat to remove English women and children. Mallet has authorised [RIM] Comet to accompany them.

Page 147: telegram to Sir Louis Mallet from Foreign Office 17 October 1914: [HMS] Espiegle is not in Turkish territorial waters and any attack on her by Turkish authorities will be a wanton act of aggression. HM Government consider they have right to passage down Shatt-al-Arab as long as Goeben and Breslau with German crews and officers have free use of territorial waters.

Page 148: telegram from Sir Louis Mallet (Constantinople) 17 October 1914 - reliable informant reports that mines are being sent to Basra and will reach Baghdad in a day or two.

Page 149: telegram from Sir Louis Mallet (Constantinople) to Foreign Office 17 October 1914 reporting on Turkish troop movements at Basrah and vicinity.

Page 153: telegram from Sir Louis Mallet (Constantinople) to Foreign Office 19 October 1914 from Consular Officer at Alexandretta - Turkish army and naval personnel including German officers have arrived en route to Basrah where they will take delivery of German cruiser Emden. Maan is their true destination.

Page 156: Mines for the Shatt-al-Arab, Draft signed by Vice Admiral Sir Edmund Slade 19 October 1914 in which he suggests that orders should be sent to HM ships to prevent these mines being laid.

Pages 157 and 158: draft telegram from Secretary of State, Foreign Office, 21 October 1914: instructing Political Resident at Baghdad and HM Consuls in the river to watch for mines and to warn HMS Espiegle.

Page 160: telegram from S.N.O. Persian Gulf, Mohammerah to Admiralty 21 October 1914: reporting on the laying of mines by the Turks and that Turksih troops and guns are being placed on island opposite Karun where [HMS] Espiegle is anchored.

Page 163: telegram from Admiralty to Commander in Chief East Indies, Aden, Bombay 22 October 1914: Emden is reported to be sailing to Basrah. Advisable therefore to cover military expedition going up the Gulf. [HMS] Duke of Edinburgh should be detached for this service.

Topics

Shipping

Internment

International

Railways

Asia

Europe and Russia

Conflict

Weapons

Children

Navy

Official publications

Middle East

Communications

Armed Forces (General Administration)

Operations, battles and campaigns

Sex and gender